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ZEV J. EIGEN† 
ABSTRACT 
Since the mid 2000s, a cottage industry has slowly blossomed of empirical 
research dedicated to advancing accounts of contracts “on the books”—
accounting for what contracts tend to purportedly obligate signers to do, and 
contracts “in action”—accounting for how contracting parties tend to behave. 
This article reviews this literature, which spans several disciplines, most notably 
law, economics, and management, identifying eight categories of empirical 
questions in common across all disciplines, highlighting key findings, points of 
consensus, and noting areas most pressingly in need of additional research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Empirical exploration of contracts is not a new thing. Some trace the roots of serious 
empirical exploration of private contracting to Stewart Macaulay’s seminal work in 1963. It 
may be said that empirics are playing catch-up to theory, which has had a significantly longer 
tradition in scholarship in law and social sciences. To understand the diversity of disciplinary 
approaches and framings of questions about contracts raised in modern empirical explorations, 
it may be useful to briefly articulate the intertwined trajectory of contract doctrine, theory, and 
empirics. 
 Contracts are historically ancient means of managing and regulating dyadic exchanges. 
Contract’s doctrinal roots are traceable to actions in assumpsit, which were variations on 
trespass, used in varied contexts like debt collection, marriage enforcement, surgical mishaps, 
and similar transactions. An action in contract distinct from trespass was perhaps first noted in 
1348 in the case of the Humber Ferryman (Simpson 1987). In that case, a ferryman was paid for 
transporting the plaintiff’s horse across a body of water, but the horse drowned allegedly due to 
the ferryman’s miscalculations. Consideration was added to the doctrinal contractual landscape 
in the sixteenth century. In the Golding’s Case, the Solicitor-General made what could be the 
first statement of a clear general principle of consideration, when he declared that, “in every 
action upon the case upon a promise, there are three things considerable: consideration, 
promise, and breach of promise” (Simpson 1987: 319). 
 Contract law evolved in parallel with liberal democratic ideals about free market 
exchange. In fact, since their modern formalization as legal, state-backed instruments, 
contractual exchange has been hailed as the foundation of both capitalism and the liberal state 
(Farnsworth 1982; Friedman 1965; Macaulay 1985; Selznick 1969; Smith 1904; Thompson 
1975). Under the common liberal theoretical version of contract formation, contract 
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enforceability was grounded in law as much as, and in harmony with moral concerns, social 
constraints, and instrumental calculations. As a result, contracts provided formal state-backed 
instruments that seemed to obviate the need for reliance on alternative means of ensuring that 
deals were enforced (Blau 1968). Courts, legislators, and scholars in various fields have 
described contracts as the product of bilaterally exchanged commitments freely negotiated and 
agreed upon by the parties (Macaulay 1963; McIntyre 1994). As Friedman (1965) notes, “…the 
law of contract was the legal reflection of [the free] market and naturally took on its 
characteristics.” 
 Contracts represented a doctrinal embodiment of the collectively imagined paradigmatic 
free economic exchange in which mutually dependent actors with relatively equal access to legal 
resources, and relatively equal abilities to know and understand their respective needs and 
desires freely negotiated terms and then memorialized them in written instruments. The law 
assumed that individuals could serve their private interests by contract, and that contracts 
served the public interest by creating predictable reciprocal obligations (Slawson 1996). More 
specifically, one could point to at least the following five assumptions about how contracting 
parties behave as embodying the underlying theme of free market contracting: (1) parties know 
what they want (they understand their preferences); (2) they have relatively clear expectations 
about what their contracting counterparts want (they have a good sense of their counterparts’ 
preferences); (3) they understand when they have entered into a contract; (4) they generally feel 
bound to perform as obligated by lawful contracts into which they knowingly entered; and, (5) 
if they breach, they know that they are breaching. 
 Imagine, for instance, a bridge builder contracting with a component part manufacturer. 
Each generally understands what terms they want and do not want to be memorialized in their 
contract, what the terms mean, and what will happen if they fail to perform, roughly to the 
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same degree. Each has at least a minimal threshold understanding of the mechanics of the deal, 
and each probably feels bound to perform the terms to which they meaningfully assented in the 
absence of typical contract defenses like duress or unconscionability. Under these 
circumstances, it would seem odd not to require each party to fully bear the responsibility for 
obligations into which they knowingly entered even if a court later determined that the deal 
was substantively unfair to one of the parties. Indeed, the law often treats a promise to do 
something as an indication that the promisor intends to perform as promised (Ayres and Klass 
2005). For the most part, this is what the law did and continues to do.  
 Over time, contract law might not have evolved very much away from these assumptions, 
but contract scholarship has. As theory developed, contract was often conceived of as being in 
stark relief from what doctrine aspired for contract to be. Famously, Grant Gilmore (1974), 
Charles Fried (1981), and Ian MacNeil (1985) theorized on contract’s doctrinal shortcomings 
born out of the discord between how contract is experienced and how the law assumes contract 
is experienced. Perhaps it was the earlier work by Stewart Macaulay (1963) that evaluated the 
circumstances under which parties sought enforcement of terms in contracts between 
businesses that partially paved the way for these theoretical reconceptualizations. Since that 
paper, which provocatively opened by asking, “[w]hat good is contract law? Who uses it? 
When and how,” a growing number of scholars employing an expanding arsenal of 
methodological techniques have continued to probe the relationship between how people are 
supposed to behave around contracts, and how they actually behave, as Macaulay did in 1963. As 
others have observed (Becher 2009a), there is a wide gap between contract law’s underlying 
assumptions and the modern reality of how contract is often experienced. This seems to be one of 
several driving forces behind the growth of empirical scholarship on contracts that has 
burgeoned in recent years. The primary alternative, but parallel, driving force is the use of 
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contracts to vet disciplinary-based theories. This appears to be most true for economic theories. 
This paper next maps this evolving landscape, identifying common threads across disciplines as 
well as gaps fillable by future research. Recommendations are then offered for productive ways 
to expand on empirical contractual studies both substantively and methodologically. 
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
  This paper’s focus is on providing a critical survey of the recent literature on empirical 
analyses of contracts, and on offering directions for future research. This could be done 
effectively in several ways. I have chosen to do this by categorizing existing research as 
attempting to answer one or more of the eight empirical questions specified below: 
(1) How do courts interpret contracts? 
(2) What is the relationship between public policy (laws) and contract terms? 
(3) What terms are in contracts? 
(4) Do individuals read contracts they sign? 
(5) How do individuals perceive, interpret, or experience contract terms? 
(6) What is the relationship between contract terms and performance, breach, or 
renegotiation? 
(7) Are contract terms associated with contractor characteristics or contracting settings?  
(8) Is there a relationship between trust and contracts? 
 
 These eight questions represent my attempt to aggregate up from more specific questions 
presented in empirical papers on contracts reviewed from 2005 through January of 2012. For 
instance, if a paper sought to explore whether including a liquidated damages provision in a 
contract is associated with an increased willingness on the part of contracting parties to exploit 
efficient breach opportunities (Wilkinson-Ryan 2010), I aggregated this question up to a more 
generalized phrasing of the inquiry: “what is the relationship between contract terms and 
performance, breach, or renegotiation?” (number 6 in the list above). The goal was to find 
common questions asked based on what was measured as independent and dependent variables, 
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and to consolidate questions in a way that was most useful for dividing empirical approaches to 
contracts spanning across varied disciplines. Empirical analyses are often closely tethered to 
theoretical advances. Because contracts are of interest to an array of disciplines, I thought that 
it would be difficult to reduce the set of questions to a manageable number. This turned out not 
to be the case. 
Methods  
 It was no easy task identifying papers defining the universe of empirical papers primarily 
concerned with contracts in recent years (going back to 2005). In fact, in spite of our attempts 
to be as diligent as possible, it is likely that the research assistants and I who conducted the 
research missed some papers. The goal was to generate a large and representative sample of 
empirical work on scholarship, not to exhaustively sort and code the universe of all papers that 
could have been found with a more systematic and comprehensive search. Starting with a 
bibliography I created for another recent project enumerating thirty empirical articles on 
contracts, we worked through that list, reviewing bibliographies of the articles and book 
chapters cited therein. We looked up articles cited in the articles those articles cited. We 
supplemented this snowball method by looking up authors’ SSRN pages and academic affiliation 
pages to find other empirical contracts papers they may have authored. We then used Lexis-
Nexis, Westlaw, JSTOR, SSRN, HeinOnline, Northwestern’s law library’s digital search tool, 
Wiley, and Google Scholar to identify more papers, using the ones identified as frequently cited 
as hubs from which to expand additional searches.1 We also reviewed ContractsProf Blog,2 
which featured a helpful list of contracts scholarship from 2011 in December of 2011. We 
excluded theoretical papers and ones in which the focus was on a different topic (for instance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Search terms were intentionally broad, such as, “contract(s),” “empirical,” “quantitative,” 
“qualitative,” “experiment(al),” and “case study” in various combinations. 
2 http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/ 
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women’s rights, or marketing of insurance contracts), papers dealing primarily with contracts 
with public entities (for instance, government contracting or subcontracting), papers with 
econometric models without accompanying empirical data, and papers in which contracts were 
more incidental than central to the analysis. This excluded psychology papers about the 
“psychological contract” (Bal et al. 2008), sociology papers on the “social contract” (Kochan and 
Shulman 2007), and labor law papers focused on collective bargaining, as well as other papers 
in areas not primarily epicentered on contracts, like work on consumer choices on service 
contracts (Chen, Kalra and Sun 2009). This quasi-formal empirical method led us to papers 
mostly from law, economics, management, psychology, and sociology, and hybrid “law-and-“ 
disciplines like “law and economics.” 
 We identified 113 scholarly articles from 2005 through January of 2012, which form the 
basis of the discussion and analysis in this article. The eight questions listed above emerged 
from reviewing and coding these 113 papers. I group these questions as originating from one or 
both of two propositions that epitomize distinct approaches to empirically understanding 
behaviors around contracts: 
PROPOSITION 1: Contracts are a product of how drafters and signers interpret the law. 
PROPOSITION 2: Contracts are a product of factors exogenous to the law. 
 The two propositions are not mutually exclusive. In fact, I have written about how and 
when they overlap (Eigen 2008). They are distinct in their sources for motivating or framing 
empirical research on contracts. In this sense, they offer alternative poles for motivating or 
addressing the eight questions identified across disciplines. Figure 1 depicts how one could 
think of the eight empirical questions as tending to align according to the propositional poles.  
For instance, questions about courts’ interpretations of contracts (DiMatteo 2006; Zeiler and 
Krawiec 2005), and the relationship between public policy and contract terms (Dietz 2011; 
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Kurschilgen 2011) tend to be more consistently motivated by the notion that answering these 
questions will inform behavioral outcomes because contracts are the product of drafters’ and 
signers’ interpretation of law. Factors exogenous to the law seem less relevant to the inquiry 
(whether they are measured or not). However, the primary motivation for empirical pursuits 
focused on these questions tends to be the first proposition and not the second. On the other 
side of the spectrum, empirical evaluations of the relationship between contracts and trust, 
which come mostly from management studies, are motivated by theories of trust and 
reciprocity in dyadic exchanges, or other decision making theories, which tend to be 
conceptualized in the absence of law (Chou, Halevy and Murninghan 2012; Lumineau and 
Malhotra 2011). They are primarily concerned with contracts as functions of factors exogenous 
to law. 
 Questions 4 through 7 are in the middle of the two poles because this cluster of questions 
tends to be motivated by either or both propositions. Papers addressing question 4, (do signers 
read their contracts?) tend to be more motivated by the first proposition than the second, often 
because of the assumption that reading contracts is an essential component of notice about 
terms, and hence their enforceability (Becher 2009b; Hillman 2009). Papers addressing question 
4 are also mostly about form-contracts or “boilerplate,” which are a fruitful and important 
ground for continued empirical study discussed more below. But, it is sometimes the case that 
this vector of scholarship is also motivated by factors exogenous to law as explanations (Bakos 
2009; Plaut and Bartlett 2011). Hence, this question is located closer to the middle of the two 
propositions in Figure 1. 
   [ FIGURE 1 ] 
 Question 5 (how do individuals perceive, interpret, or experience contract terms?) is 
located as close to the middle of the two propositions as any of the questions. This question also 
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spans the most disciplines (economics, law, law and economics, law and society, and 
management). For instance, Doron Teichman (2010) offers a qualitative case study of 
contracting to explore norms of contract interpretation. The work explores “microlevel” 
contracting decisions that individuals make, and draws upon economic theory as well as legal 
theory to explain when and why Israeli real estate contracts are denominated in American 
dollars and not the native Israeli currency. My own work (Eigen 2008) presents a qualitative 
account of how individuals who had signed mandatory arbitration contracts with their 
employers experienced and interpreted that agreement. The work draws on sociological 
theories to articulate a construct, called, “malleable consent,” describing individuals who sign 
contracts with the expectation that the agreements’ unfavorable terms will not be enforced 
against them. In both of these instances and in others, the empirical explorations are motivated 
by both propositions: contracts are the product of individuals perceptions of law as well as 
factors exogenous to the law such as norms of behavior, and social and moral constraints. 
 The sixth question (what is the relationship between contract terms and performance, 
breach, or renegotiation?) has become more important over time. In fact, five of the six 
empirical contracts papers identified in 2012 fall under this category (Brooks, Stremitzer and 
Tontrup 2012; Eigen 2012b; Feldman, Schurr and Teichman 2012; Lumineau and Quelin 2012; 
Nikolaev 2012). These papers examine behavior of contracting parties as a function of their 
perceptions of the contracts into which they have entered, or as a function of the contracts 
themselves, assuming a relatively uniform interpretation of the contract terms, obviating the 
need for a measure of individual interpretation of the terms. Law is relevant here, but the 
primary focus on behavior tends to evidence motivation drawn closer to the second proposition 
than the first. 
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 The same could be said about the seventh question (are contract terms associated with 
contractor characteristics or contracting settings?). However, the motivation for papers 
answering this question tends to align more closely with the second proposition than the first. 
This is perhaps a function of the fact that the characteristics and contracting settings studied 
tend to most frequently derive from economic theories. For instance, Brown, et al. (2006) 
explore the relationship between risk preference and terms in employment contracts. Carson et 
al. (2006) measure the extent to which volatility drives opportunism under formal but not 
relational contracting. Similarly, Hu and Qiu (2010) find that firms are more likely to use 
formal contracts (as opposed to relational ones) if they are located in a city different from the 
firm’s main business location. Lastly, Barthélemy and Quélin (2006) use Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) and the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm to frame their analysis of the 
relationship between exchange hazards (such as specificity and environmental uncertainty), 
contractual terms (control, incentives, and price), and the level of ex post transaction costs. 
 It may be worth noting the distribution of the eight questions across the 113 papers and 
85 months explored for these analyses. As some papers addressed more than one of the eight 
questions, there are a total of 122 questions asked over the 113 papers. Figure 2 shows the 
break-down of the percentages of questions posed. The most frequently asked question across 
all disciplines is question 3 (what terms are in contracts?). This might partially be a function of 
the relative ease of access of data containing contracts as opposed to other data. As laws change 
to require organizations to publicize their contracts in publicly available databases, it is easier 
to analyze pre-existing databases than to create new behavioral data with experiments or by 
gathering or observing behavior. For instance, in May, 2010, agreements were publicly posted 
in a new Federal Reserve Database, and the Credit CARD Act of 2009 obligated credit card 
issuers to post their agreements there. CreditCards.com analyzed the readability of 1,200 
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contracts from this database finding that most credit card contracts are written in language 
most Americans are unable to understand.3 It may also reflect the lower cost of obtaining the 
data and running empirical tests on contracts themselves, again relative to alternative empirical 
measures of other kinds of data like surveys and behavioral experiments. 
 The second most frequently asked question is number 5 (how do individuals perceive, 
interpret, or experience contract terms?). Often this category relies on survey data. The third 
most frequently asked question is number six (what is the relationship between contract terms 
and performance, breach, or renegotiation?), followed by number seven (are contract terms 
associated with contractor characteristics or contracting settings?). The smallest percentage of 
research is dedicated to question 1 (how do courts interpret contracts?). This makes sense if 
one weighs the degree of impact a study potentially may make without overlapping existing 
findings against the costs of pursuing the empirical study being contemplated. It may also be a 
function of increasing interdisciplinary based approaches by empirical scholars interested in 
contracts, who are concerned more with how theories from their disciplines impact this 
important area of private law, often irrespective of how courts interpret contracts. Lastly, this 
may reflect the roots of empirical exploration of contract, in which early work such as 
Macaulay’s (1963) or Lisa Bernstein’s (1992) exemplified the potential for significant 
contribution by exploring things other than court opinions on contracts. 
   [ FIGURE 2 ] 
Disciplines  
 Consistent with others who have surveyed empirical studies of contracts before 2006, it 




framing researchers’ approaches to the questions identified above (Macher and Richman 2008; 
Smith and King 2009). For instance, Smith and King (2009) reviewed forty top journals in six 
disciplines or sub-disciplines (economics, financial economics, law and economics, strategy and 
management, sociology, and law) from 1990 through 2006 and found that of the 52 empirical 
studies of contract4 they identified, that 48 were framed as testing various economic theories 
such as incomplete contract theory and agency theory. However, there seems to be a difference 
if one codes papers’ disciplinary affiliations not based on the theories they advance or the 
training of the authors, but on the journals in which they are published or being targeted for 
publication in the case of working papers. In short, it may be safe to say that economic theories 
(at least as used to frame empirical analyses of contracts) have found a home with traditional 
law reviews and empirical law journals such as the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 35.4% of 
the 113 papers were published or targeted for publication in traditional law journals. 25.7% 
were published in management journals; 23% in economics journals, and 9% in law and 
economics journals. Four papers (3.5%) came from finance journals, two (1.8%) from law and 
society related journals, one (.9%) from econometrics/statistics, and one (.9%) from law and 
psychology. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of scholarly work by discipline over the time 
period in question. 
   [ FIGURE 3 ] 
 A few observations may be worth noting here. First, management journals and law 
journals appear to be consistent and slowly growingly receptive outlets for empirical work on 
contracts. It may be surprising to some readers how little relative publication space is allocated 
to empirical work on contracts in psychology and sociology. My suspicion is that this is due to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This figure includes only studies empirically examining actual contracts. It excludes 
studies using surveys about contracts, and other data sources. 
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the perception by some in these disciplines of contracts as legal instruments, which belong in 
“law and psychology” or “law and sociology” journals instead of psychology or sociology 
outlets. This might be a function of the perceived limitations of the set of eight questions 
identified above, and the pull of the first proposition as being perceived as a substitute for 
testable hypotheses derived from psychology and sociology instead of as a compliment. 
Economics, by contrast, while not an entirely consistent market for empirical work on 
contracts, has been more receptive than these other disciplines. Economists seem to be drawn 
to empirical work on contracting because this setting offers fruitful grounds to demonstrate 
how private exchanges confirm or undermine traditional economic theories, often regarding 
rationality and efficiency in a market setting. Lastly, perhaps, optimistically, it is worth noting 
the positive trend of total scholarly papers devoted to empirical exploration of contracts across 
all disciplines. If the papers reviewed from only January of this year are any indication, 2012 is 
projected to be a banner year for work in this area across all disciplines. 
 
Findings  
 Recent empirical work on contracts has advanced our understanding of how contracting 
entities experience contracts in important ways. First, there is growing consensus among 
researchers that actors do not consistently behave rationally, or in ways that optimize 
efficiency. This has been important particularly for those interested in how contracts may be 
written to incentivize performance (Brooks, Stremitzer and Tontrup 2012; Fehr, Hart and 
Zehnder 2011b; Feldman and Teichman 2011). Studies on reference points (Fehr, Hart and 
Zehnder 2011a), effects of formal versus flexible contract terms (Green and Heywood 2011), 
and opportunities for renegotiation (Nikolaev 2012) exemplify how much context and framing 
influence behavior around contracts, perhaps more so than the terms themselves. For instance, 
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a study by Hannan, Hoffman, and Moser (2005) found that employees were more averse to 
having to pay a penalty than they were to not receiving a bonus, and therefore chose a higher 
level of effort under a penalty contract. They also found that individuals perceived the bonus 
contract as more fair than the penalty contract, and therefore were more likely to work harder 
in reciprocity.  
 A second particularly robust finding emergent from empirical work on contracts is that 
moral constraints are important in understanding how individuals interpret contractual 
obligations. Perhaps empirical evidence of the relative effects of morality in contracting is 
overdue. The notion of “keeping one’s promise” has origins in the bible:  “[i]f a man…takes an 
oath to bind himself…he shall not violate his word” (Numbers 30:2). Durkheim (1893) argued 
that contracts could not exist without a preexisting set of institutionalized moral agreements.  
Modern theorists have argued for morality’s central role for decades (Atiyah 1979; Fried 1981). 
As Sutton described, “in effect, contract law… defines the nature of contractual obligations and 
invokes a transcendent authority to ensure that they will be enforced” (2001: 33). Promise and 
doctrinal contract have clearly intertwined roots (Fourcade and Healy 2007), but until recently, 
there has been little empirical evidence of how social actors interpret the promise implicitly 
made by signing a contract, and less evidence of the perceived relationship in the context of 
form-adhesive contracts, which will be discussed separately. 
 There has been an explosion of empirical findings supporting the role of moral and 
normative constraints in explaining contractual behavior in recent years. For instance, 
Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron (2009) used a series of web-based questionnaires to measure the 
extent to which individuals accounted for morality in evaluating the actions of a party 
breaching a contract. Their results suggest that subjects “seemed to believe that intentionally 
breaking a contractual promise is a punishable moral harm in itself.” Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) 
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also used vignette studies to show that morality affects individuals’ decisions in a mortgage 
default context. Her findings suggest that less social stigma surrounding mortgage defaults 
following the recent housing collapse reduce the degree to which individuals feel socially 
constrained to avoid breaching their own contracts. Findings also suggest reduced reciprocity 
norms when lending institutions are perceived as greedy or predatory. Feldman and 
Teichman’s (2011) recent research using randomly assigned vignettes similarly illustrates the 
degree to which attitudes about breaching a contract are laden with moral judgments. Lastly, 
findings from an online experiment suggest the relative effectiveness of a moral framing as 
compared to four alternative framings (moral, social, legal, instrumental, and generic) of 
attempts to convince participants who had breached a contract to cure their breaches (Eigen 
2012b). 
 A final area that has received some attention recently from empiricists is “form-adhesive” 
contracts. One relatively modern development in contract’s evolution, coinciding with the rise 
of the modern corporation (Edelman and Suchman 1997) is the proliferation of unilateral form 
contracts5 that have come to dominate the contemporary contractual landscape (Ben-Shahar 
2007). Form-adhesive contracts (unilaterally drafted and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis) 
are the dominant means of regulating exchanges between organizations and individuals in 
contemporary life (Ben-Shahar 2007). They are particularly ubiquitous on the internet 
(Marotta-Wurgler 2011a). Online vendors, financial institutions, service providers, social 
networking sites, and purveyors of news and other information require individuals to consent 
to form-contracts in order to receive the benefit of the underlying bargain. Perhaps the recent 
interest is a function of the increased awareness in scholarship (Ben-Shahar 2005) and in the 
public generally (Sullivan 2007) that contracts are rarely the result of freely negotiated bilateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The terms “form-adhesive contract” and “form-contract” are used interchangeably to mean 
the same thing. 
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commitments in contemporary life in academic circles. The consequences of this are largely 
unstudied. 
 Empirical research has recently begun probing whether and to what extent the 
proliferation of form-adhesive contracts represents an attempt by organizations to exploit 
individuals.  Sociologists of organizations have documented the way in which firms exploit the 
law to replicate existing power advantages they hold over individuals with whom they deal—
employees, customers, and care and service recipients (Edelman and Suchman 1997; 1999).  
One of the best ways to do this might be with form-contracts because contracts lend the 
impression of legal constraints, and by implication, invoke the State as the background 
sanctioning body of the contents of the contract, lending the impression of legitimacy and 
authority to the drafters (Eigen 2008). As Richard Ely remarked, “when economic forces make 
possible oppression and deprivation of liberty, oppression and deprivation of liberty express 
themselves in contract” (Kaufman 2003: 8). 
 One way that the question of whether form-contracts’ benefits outweigh their detriments 
has been explored has been by cataloguing the contents of typical form-adhesive contracts such 
as end-user-license agreements (“EULA”s) and related online boilerplate, and measuring their 
exploitative terms. For instance, Marotta-Wurgler (2008) analyzed the contents of 647 
software license agreements, finding that sellers with market power do not offer unusually 
harsh terms in the form-adhesive contracts they draft and promulgate. 
 However, it may be the case that even if the terms themselves are not unusually 
exploitive, individuals’ tend not to read them, as evidenced by other work by Marotta-Wurgler 
(2011b) and others (Eigen 2012a; Plaut and Bartlett 2011). So, it might be important to 
empirically evaluate the extent to which reading matters for performance (or non-performance) 
of contract terms, and the extent to which individuals’ perceptions of the contracts are relevant 
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to contract performance and behavior. An experiment by the author offers evidence that 
suggests that readership is positively correlated with performance of a contract (Eigen 2012a). 
Others have demonstrated that contracts have signaling effects—such as more completeness as 
a signal of less trust and cooperation (Chou, Halevy and Murninghan 2012). A qualitative study 
of employees who had signed mandatory arbitration agreements revealed varied beliefs about 
the contents and effects of those contracts, in spite of low readership rates (Eigen 2008).  
 Besides this, there appears to be a growing public sense of the opportunity for 
exploitation as being sufficiently worrisome, even independent of the terms themselves. 
Perhaps the most unsettling popular example of this is an episode of Southpark, which first 
aired on Comedy Central on April 27, 2011.6 In this episode, a boy and two others are forced to 
submit to a horrific experiment because they clicked to agree to Apple’s iTunes end-user license 
agreement. When he discovers the terms to which he consented even though he does not read 
English, one of the victims declares, “I should have never updated iTunes!” Echoing this 
concern has been an academic voice. For instance, in an article aptly titled, “They Can Do 
What!?” Alces and Greenfield note that “[t]here is something about [unilateral change-of-
terms provisions common in consumer form-contracts] that rankles” (2010: 1107). In short, it 
is still unclear to what extent perceptions about contracts derived less from reading them, and 
more from popular perceptions and other sources, impact contracting behavior. It is also 









 Empirical work on contracts is growing. Research has continued to ask and answer 
important questions. Often, empirical work has tested theory and sometimes helped extend it. 
This is a productive, symbiotic relationship, and I hope it continues. Any recommendations I 
have are surely reflective of my own biases as an empirical contracts scholar. With that as a 
caveat, here are first some substantive suggestions for directions of empirical work on 
contracts, followed by some methodological suggestions. 
Substance 
 There has been a disproportionate focus on answering the question, “what terms are in 
contracts?” This is an important question, and not one that should be ignored. Indeed, it would 
be useful to empirically test the degree to which terms are unilaterally (or bilaterally) altered 
over time in response to the claim that the prevalence of unilateral-change terms in contracts is 
irksome (Alces and Greenfield 2010). However, more work needs to be done answering the 
questions, “what is the relationship between contract terms and performance, breach, or 
renegotiation?” and “are contract terms associated with contractor characteristics or 
contracting settings?” It seems that these are questions that could be taken up more frequently 
by everyone, but particularly by sociologists and negotiation scholars who have contributed 
less than one might expect to empirical contract scholarship. 
 Additionally, while there has been some empirical attention paid to form-adhesive 
contracting, particularly in online transactions, there is significantly less known about 
individual behavior with respect to such contracts than bilateral contracts. Given the 
disproportionate rate at which individuals enter into form-contracts relative to bilaterally 
negotiated ones, more work in this area is clearly needed. One important, relatively 
 19 
understudied area is the extent to which variation in contract formation matters to 
performance, breach, or renegotiation. A recent experiment offered initial experimental 
evidence that notice of contract terms and increased participation in the pre-consent phase of 
contracting are associated with increased performance (Eigen 2012b). But, more work in this 
area seems sorely needed. 
 Two related areas in need of empirical work are exploration of the effects of renegotiation 
and informal contracting behavior. Most of the work in these areas has been in finance (Roberts 
and Sufi 2009), dealing with experimentally contrived “buyers and sellers” (Fehr, Hart and 
Zehnder 2011a), and involving inter-firm contracting (Lumineau and Quelin 2012). In spite of 
claims made about renegotiation in the consumer context obviating the concerns raised about 
consumer form-contracts being bad for consumers (Bebchuk and Posner 2006; Johnston 2006), 
there are no empirical studies on the rates of ex-post renegotiation of contracts, or on the 
related question of selective enforceability of contracts. Selective enforcement of unfavorable 
contract terms has been suggested to occur along socio-economic status lines (Eigen 2008), but 
no empirical work has been done to support or refute this. With informal contracting, context 
seems to matter greatly (Gil 2010), and the effects of informality have been studied. However, 
seemingly no attention has been empirically paid to the degree to which informality of 
contracting obligation matters when the base-rate expectation of formality is high or low. 
Endogeneity problems associated with contracting parties who know each other selecting the 
kinds of agreements to bind themselves (formal versus informal) potentially call into question 
the generalizability of the findings in some studies in this area. So, this too is a fertile area for 
future exploration. 
 Another instance of theory being relatively untested is the questions of whether and to 
what extent individuals perceive the terms in their mostly unread form-contracts to be 
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innocuous or oppressive, and the degree to which it matters to individuals (if at all) whether the 
terms in form-contracts are perceived as oppressive. Given the relative paucity of empirical work 
on the degree to which contracts substitute for trust, and the fact that within the findings in 
this area, there is no clear answer, more empirical work could be done here. In many instances 
of form-contracting, there are clear promises made about the exchange that are sometimes 
inconsistent with the terms in the fine print. A productive area in which to study trust and 
reciprocity could be when contracting entities are consistent (trustworthy) or inconsistent 
(untrustworthy) between what they promise (verbally, or in an advertisement) and in the terms 
they unilaterally foist on individuals to sign in order to receive the benefit of the original 
promise. 
 Lastly, as more attention is paid to the “Occupy Wall Street” and related movements, it 
could also be useful to examine the extent to which individuals want to and would be willing to 
use law (embodied in contract) as a means of protest against organizations seen as economically 
dominant. To what extent are form-contracts viewed as instruments of economic oppression? 
To what extent would individuals who regard form-contracts as instruments of economic 
oppression be willing to reciprocate against organizations? What form would such 
reciprocation take?  
Methods 
 Very few of the 113 papers reviewed were qualitative. This is unfortunate. As theory and 
empirics symbiotically self propagate to maximize advancement of knowledge, so too with 
qualitative studies and quantitate ones. It would be beneficial if researchers engaged in more 
qualitative studies answering the substantive questions identified above. Structuring such 
research with clearly identifiable goals of exploring process-based explanations for empirically 
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observed effects would go a long way towards augmenting our understanding of contracting 
behaviors and pushing theory beyond current boundaries (Silbey 2003). 
 Additionally, forty percent of the 113 papers used experimental methodologies. This is a 
relatively high percentage, and likely reflects the premium placed on experimental 
methodologies for isolating and testing effects in a laboratory. All but one of the experiments in 
the pool of research evaluated involved either decision-making based on stylized scenarios in a 
laboratory, or randomly assigned vignette-based (what-would-you-do-if) surveys. Much can 
and has been learned from these experiments. Like all methods, they involve trade-offs. The 
downsides of experimentation of this sort are potentially diminished generalizability and 
external validity. These concerns might be amplified by the subject matter in question. 
Contractual obligations are rooted in law, and people’s perceptions of law are not necessarily 
consistent with their actions (Ewick and Silbey 1998). One might behave differently in a 
laboratory setting in which contracts are fictionalized, or on a survey asking what one would 
do if contractually obligated one way or another than one would if actually contractually 
obligated to behave a certain way. The experiment that did not use vignettes or stylized 
contractual what-if scenarios involved an online setting in which subjects were randomly 
assigned to different contractual conditions (and a control condition of no contract) (Eigen 
2012b). In all but one condition, subjects consented to the terms of the research via contracts of 
varying degrees of adhesiveness. The experiment measured subjects’ behaviors on the task 
purportedly obligated by the live contracts. Of course, there are significant limitations of this 
research design too. In the interest of promoting methodological diversity, and in gaining some 
traction by increasing external validity in some studies, I hope others design experiments on 
contracts inspired by the creative work of Cialdini (1971), and more recently by Salganik and 
Duncan (2008), which also exploits the Internet as a laboratory for behavioral experimentation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Recent empirical advances have shown us that contracts are dynamic, not static, 
instruments, interpretable only in the context in which they are embedded, often lacking 
objectively interpretable meaning, and as capable of being framed in different ways to generate 
varied behavioral outcomes as measured by performance, breach, repeat exchange, and other 
measures. Instead, it is perhaps more useful to construe contracts as prisms, refracting the light 
through which situational framings and contexts shine. Interpretation of contract requires an 
understanding of the instruments’ context, and perhaps most importantly, a willingness to cast 
aside presumptions of enforceability of contract heretofore nearly universally present implicitly 
or explicitly in non-empirical scholarship, policy, and legal opinions.  In the context of form-
adhesive contracts, empirical work seems to benefit from an acknowledgement of the effects of 
the misalignment of contract as imagined—as the product of bilateral negotiations—and 
contract as experienced—as a foisted jumble of fine print often intentionally obscured, made 
too complicated to decipher, and sometimes downplayed (Sullivan 2007) by drafting 
organizations. 
 The fruitful research advanced by empirical contracts scholars validates Suchman’s (2003) 
description of contracts as social artifacts. Contracts as social artifacts take on meaning far 
beyond the four corners of the written terms themselves, and upon inspection, offer significant 
insight into social and economic exchange in private life. This review of recent empirical work 
on contracts reveals the fungibility of contract and the rule of law in what could be 
characterized as post-Durkheimian and post-Weberian contemporary life, wherein the role of 
law is reduced, and perhaps more importantly, compartmentalized—ending up functioning 
more as a parallel or shadow of other extra-legal sources of power, authority, status, and norms 
of exchange, instead of as a driving force moderating or mediating social and economic 
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exchange on its own.  As this review reveals, there is much more to learn about how individuals 
experience and interpret contracts. Hopefully, the groundwork is laid for continued empirical 
research, necessary to better understand contracting behaviors and their effects on outcomes of 
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